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ARGUMENT 
I. C.A. Johnson Trenching, L.C.'s strict liability claim is not barred 
under the Economic Loss Rule. 
Vermeer Manufacturing Co. (hereinafter referred to as "Vermeer") argues that C.A. 
Johnson Trenching, L.C.'s (hereinafter referred to as "Johnson") claim for strict liability 
was barred and properly dismissed by the trial court under the Economic Loss Rule. (Brief 
of Appellee, at 5). The Economic Loss Rule has been defined as: 
damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement 
of the defective product, or consequential loss of profits— 
without any claim of personal injury or damage to other 
property . . . as well as fthe diminution in the value of the 
product because it is inferior in quality and does not work for 
the general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold.' 
American Towers Owners Association, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 93 0 P.2d 1182,1139 
(Utah 1996) quoting Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 579-
80 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, unless there is damage to property other than the 
defective product or personal injury, the Economic Loss Rule would preclude such 
recovery. 
Johnson's Complaint alleged that Vermeer was strictly liable "for all damages 
resulting from the trencher' s failure caused by the Defendant Vermeer Manufacturing Co." 
(R. at 3). The Complaint's prayer for relief sought both special and general damages as 
may be determined by the Court. (R. at 2). Vermeer argues that the Complaint did not 
seek damages to property other than the trencher or personal injuries. (Brief of Appellee, 
at 6). However, that is not a proper characterization of what the Johnson's Complaint was 
seeking—Johnson was seeking both special and general damages "as a result of the failure 
of the trencher as alleged [in the Complaint]". (R. at 2). Such broad language may have 
included damages to property other than the trencher or bodily injury. Because Johnson's 
Complaint was drafted with such broad, inclusive language, any bodily injury or damage 
to other property would have been included in the claim for damages. Therefore, it was 
improper for the trial court, using the Economic Loss Rule, to dismiss Johnson's claim for 
strict liability. 
II. Johnson never agreed to be bound by Vermeer's disclaimer of the 
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular 
purpose. 
Vermeer claims that the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose were both disclaimed by it in the Limited Warranty when Johnson 
"received and acknowledged on the date the trencher was purchased." (Brief of Appellee, 
at 9). Using the language of Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-316(2), which requires that any 
exclusion or modification of the implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose must be in writing and conspicuous, Vermeer argues that the Limited 
Warranty expressly excluded the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose, and that Johnson "explicitly agreed'1 to the terms of the Limited 
Warranty by tilling out and signing the small document entitled Limited Warranty for 
Industrial Equipment (referred to by Vermeer as "the warranty registration form"). (Brief 
of Appellee, at 9). 
An examination of the document does not reveal language that Johnson specifically 
agreed to be bound by Vermeer s disclaimer of the implied warranties of merchantability 
and fitness for a particular purpose. Vermeer s Limited Warranty for Industrial Equipment 
merely states that "I, the owner, hereby acknowledge that.. J am familiar with the Limited 
Warranty Statement in the operator's manual." Johnson's employee may have 
acknowledged familiarity with the Limited Warranty Statement, but the document does not 
state that Johnson agreed to be bound by it. With no language evidencing agreement to 
be bound by the Limited Warranty Statement, the disclaimer of the implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose is ineffective. 
Vermeer cites Boud v. SDNCd Inc.. 2002 UT 83, 54 P.3d 1131 (Utah 2002) for 
further support for its argument that the disclaimer was proper. (Brief of Appellee, 11). 
However, Boud is distinguishable from the present case based upon the precise language 
of the disclaimers. In Boud, the contract between the parties stated: 
Purchaser agrees that his contract includes all of the terms, 
conditions and warranties on both the face and reverse side 
hereof, that this agreement cancels and supersedes any prior 
agreement and as of the date hereof comprises the complete and 
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to the 
subject matter covered hereby. PURCHASER BY HIS/HER 
EXECUTION OF THIS AGREEMENT ACKNOWLEDGES 
THAT HE/SHE WAS READ ITS TERMS, CONDITIONS 
AND WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE AND THE 
REVERSE SIDE HEREOF AND A[SIC] HAS RECEIVED A 
4 
TRUE COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT. AND FURTHER 
AGREES TO PAY THE 'BALANCE DUE' SET FORTH 
ABOVE ON OR BEFORE THE DATE SPECIFIED. 
Boud, 2002 UT at *{18, 54 P.3d at 1136. In comparison to this case, there is no language 
on the Limited Warranty for Industrial Equipment that the 'purchaser agrees,' only that the 
purchaser is "familiar with the Limited Warranty Statement." (R. 21). While the Boud 
court correctly upheld the disclaimer of warranties because the specific contract's language 
evidenced an agreement by the purchaser to be bound by the contract's terms, this Court 
should not uphold Vermeer's disclaimer of the implied warranties of merchantability and 
fitness for a particular purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasons and analysis, Johnson respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the trial court's July 30, 2003 Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. 
DATED this ^ Uay of June, 2004.-
ROBQiSDH^SEILER^T^I^ZIER, LC 
Thomas W. Seiler 
Ryan T. Peel 
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant 
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